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CREDrroR-DEBToR LAw-WAGE GA ismmmT IN WASHINGTON: A
POSTSCRIPT-WAMNGTON's NEw GA NismDAEr STATuT.-Ch. 264,
Wash. Laws of 1969 and Ch. 61, Wash. Laws of 1970 (RCW Ch.
7.33).
In recent years, the legal literature has been full of critical studies
of the process of wage garnishment.' The object of these studies, the
writ of garnishment, has a long ancestry in English common law,2 but
since colonial days the writ has been a creature of statute in the United
States.' While writs of attachment and garnishment had frequently
been deemed necessary to obtain jurisdiction over disputes,4 judicial
acceptance of broadened concepts of personal jurisdiction and the
widespread use of long-arm statutes5 have greatly diminished this
need. The principal use of garnishment today is to insure the col-
lectibility of claims, by providing a fund out of which judgments may
be satisfied. 6
Briefly, garnishment can be described as a process by which a
plaintiff or a judgment creditor obtains control over the property of
1. See, e.g., Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California--A Study and Recommendations,
53 CAmr. L. REv. 1214 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Brunn]; Kerr, Wage Garnishment
Should be Prohibited, 2 PROsPcETUS 371 (1969); Project, Wage Garnishment in Wash-
ington--An Empirical Study, 43 WAsH. L. Rav. 743 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Em-
pirical Study]; Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 759
(1967); Note, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. LJ. 322 (1957).
2. Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MMarN. L. Rav. 1, 7-8
(1942). The authors state:
[Gjarnishment proceedings . . . are truly blue-blooded legal institutions that can
claim a family tree dating back to the Middle Ages. For they are the offspring of
the institute of "foreign attachment" which was well-developed in the customs of the
medieval boroughs in England. ....
3. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 208 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dis-
senting).
4. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (garnishment used to acquire quasi-in rem
jurisdiction); Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a
Debt, 27 Hanv. L. REV. 107 (1913).
5. See 43 WASH. L. REv. 833 (1968). The Washington long-arm provisions are found in
WAsH. R a. CODE §§ 4.28.180, 4.28.185 (1959).
6. The use of court-ordered execution process upon the property of a defendant after
the plaintiff has obtained a judgment raises no particular constitutional or policy problems.
In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924), it was held that
the due process clause would not require notice prior to a postjudgment garnishment, since
the defendant had been given notice and opportunity to be heard in the underlying
action.
There appears to be no good reason why a judgment creditor should be unable to use
garnishment and attachment to enforce his judgments. Prejudgment seizures, however,




a defendant which is in the possession of a third party, providing for
the holding by the court of the property pending the outcome of a
suit or the payment to the creditor of the judgment obligation. Gen-
erally a creditor can obtain a writ in either of two ways. If the creditor
has already obtained a judgment, he can present the judgment to the
court clerk to evidence the obligation, and request issuance of the
writ against some party who holds the debtor's property, often an
employer holding unpaid wages. A creditor might also obtain a pre-
judgment writ when he sues for a debt and can show some circum-
stances justifying seizure of the debtor's property prior to judgment.7
Although garnishment has been defended by creditors as a necessary
legal tool to insure that credit can be made widely available to con-
sumers,8 a number of studies have shown the process to have become
an "extraordinary remedy run amuck,"9 subject to substantial abuse
by creditors seeking a means of collecting delinquent and often dis-
puted and even nonexistent obligations. 10 Relatively unchecked use
of the garnishment process, particularly prejudgment garnishments,
had reached nearly epidemic proportions in some states, and it ap-
peared that wage garnishment, or the threat of it, was the principal
weapon of many collection companies in coercing payment from debt-
ors heavily reliant on their paychecks for subsistence." What made
7. Under the former garnishment statutes, ch. 56, § 1 [1893] Wash. Sess. Laws and ch.
109, § 1 [1913], the creditor could obtain a prejudgment writ simply by bringing suit
for a debt and alleging that the debt was due and unpaid, and by affirming that the
writ was not sought to injure the defendant or garnishee.
8. See Brunn, supra note 1, at 1239-40. This argument of creditors may not be sup-
portable by the empirical data. The Brunn study points out that there appears to be
no correlation between the availability of garnishment to creditors, and the availability of
credit to consumers. States having lenient garnishment laws, where garnishment is easily
obtained, show about the same percentage of installment debt relative to total retail
sales as do states having very restrictive garnishment laws.
9. Patterson, Foreward:Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary Remedy Run Amuck,
43 WAsH. LAW REV. 735 (1968); See note 1, supra.
10. See Statement of Pat Greathouse, United Auto Workers Vice President, Hearings
on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 803, 806 (1967) [Hereinafter cited as Hearings);
Statement of I. W. Abel, United Steelworkers President, Hearings 753, 757; Statement
of Dr. David Caplovitz, Hearings 661.
11. Statement of Pat Greathouse:
The statistics on the extent of garnishment are staggering. In just one court alone
in the city of Detroit, the common pleas court, 55,000 garnishments were issued in
1966.... A revealing study conducted among low-income families in New York City
uncovered the fact that one out of every five families interviewed had been
threatened with garnishment, had their wages garnished, or had goods repossessed.
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this practice particularly subject to criticism was the fact that, unlike
many abusive and predatory practices plaguing consumers, garnish-
ment is a state-run process, a creature of legislation administered by
the courts.?
An extensive study of the wage garnishment problem in Washing-
ton was made by members of the Washington Law Review in 1968.3
In the study, the then-existing garnishment statutes14 were analyzed
in terms of their constitutionality and in terms of the policy consider-
ations which the statutes represented or failed to represent. A number
of recommendations were made for legislative reform of the garnish-
ment process in Washington, particularly in the areas of prejudgment
garnishments, 5 enlargement of the wage exemption,"6 and employee
discharge provisions.17
The purpose of this note is to reexamine the practice of wage garnish-
ment in Washington in light of the three major developments in the
law since the Empirical Study-the enactment by Congress of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,'" the enactment by the
Washington Legislature of a new garnishment act,' 9 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation.20 The
major emphasis will be on the Washington Garnishment Act, to deter-
mine how it comports with the constitutional restrictions on prejudg-
ment garnishment set forth in Sniadach, and to measure its effectiveness
as a remedy for the problems which existed in the past.
Typically, low income families faced a major crisis of this type whenever the chief
breadwinner became ill or unemployed.
Hearings 807
12. See Brunn, supra note 1, at 1215; see also 4 ST.rA. L. REv. 237 (1952).
13. Empirical Study, supra note 1.
14. These were found in chapters 7.32 and 12.32 of WAsH. Rzv. CODE. Both chapters
were repealed in their entirety by ch. 264, [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., now codified
as WAsH. REv. CODE ch. 733 (1969). See ch. 264, § 36 [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
for list of session laws specifically revoked thereby:.
15. The Empirical Study recommended that prejudgment garnishment be abolished.
Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 785.
16. Id. at 786.
17. Id. at 790.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (Supp. V, 1970).
19. Ch. 264, [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., as amended by ch. 61, [1970] Wash.
Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. (codified as WAsH. REv. CODE ch. 7.33 (1970)).
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
As a result of the numerous critical garnishment studies and a grow-
ing tide of sentiment in favor of consumer protection, Congress en-
acted Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968,21
which became effective July 1, 1970. The Act establishes minimum
national standards for the administration of state wage garnishment
processes in the areas of wage exemptions22 and employee discharges. 3
The Federal Act specifies that its provisions will apply only to the
extent that state laws do not provide standards at least "substantially
similar" to the federal standards,24 and its provisions are not to affect
more restrictive state garnishment laws. 25 As will be seen below, it
appears that the Federal Act will not be applicable in Washington,
since the 1969 Washington Act provides at least substantially equiv-
alent limitations on garnishment in the areas covered by the Federal
Act. 26
Perhaps the most significant recent development in garnishment
law was the United States Supreme Court's Sniadach decision on June
9, 1969, holding that Wisconsin's garnishment statutes, which per-
mitted the prejudgment garnishment of the wages of a Wisconsin
resident, violated the fourteenth amendment, and characterizing the
prejudgment seizure of wages as a "taking of one's property" without
due process of law.27 Although it is unclear whether the Sniadach
holding invalidates the prejudgment garnishment of assets other than
wages, "8 it is settled that, except in cases presenting unusual or ex-
21. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (Supp. V, 1970).
22. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. V, 1970).
23. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. V, 1970).
24. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 305, 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (Supp. V, 1970).
25. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (Supp. V, 1970).
26. See notes 58-66 and 78-80 and accompanying text, infra.
27. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). The holding of course had profound effects on the practice
of wage garnishment in states other than Wisconsin, as one author demonstrates:
At the time Sniadach was decided, forty-one jurisdictions permitted some sort of
prejudgment garnishment of wages. Of these forty-one states, sixteen, including
Wisconsin, permitted alleged creditors to deprive workers of their earnings without
either a prior hearing or the demonstration of some special circumstances justifying
summary relief. It is believed that only the garnishment statutes of these sixteen
states [including Washington] were invalidated by the Sniadach decision, and even
then only to the extent that they were used to reach wages.
Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 Coma. L.J. 5, 7
(1970) (footnotes omitted).
28. For a discussion of the possible ramifications of Sniadach in areas other than
426
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ceptional circumstances, the prejudgment garnishment of wages is no
longer constitutionally permissible.
The new Washington Garnishment Act, which became effective
August 11, 1969, represents a significant modification of the garnish-
ment process in this state, particularly concerning prejudgment gar-
nishments, wage exemptions and employee discharges 9 A 1970
amendment to the 1969 Act reworded the wage exemption provision
slightly" and created a writ of 30 days duration,31 changing the scope
of the writ created by the 1969 Acts 2 Since the Act will be the basis
for all garnishments in this state, its provisions should be examined
to determine whether they meet the policy and constitutional considera-
tions suggested by the Empirical Study and mandated by Sniadach.
II. PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT RESTRICTIONS-
THE WASHINGTON STATUTE IN LIGHT OF
SNIADACH
The federal Consumer Credit Protection Act has no provision deal-
ing with prejudgment garnishment,3 3 so to the extent that prejudgment
writs may constitutionally be issued, they are governed by state law.
Section one of the Washington Act provides:34
A writ of garnishment which is not sought in order to satisfy an
existing judgment shall not be issued by the clerk.., against any
employer for the purpose of garnishing any earning he owes
his employee, unless the plaintiff sues for a debt and the plaintiff
believes that the employee:
wage garnishments, see 68 MJcH. L. Ray. 986 (1970). Two recent U.S. District Court
cases indicate that the applicability of Sniadaclh may be quite broad. See Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109 (NJ). Cal. 1970), striking down California's Innkeepers' Lien statute
and Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2082 (N.D.N.Y., July 29, 1970),
invalidating a section of New York's Civil Practice Law which permitted the pre-hearing
seizure of the household articles of a defaulting installment debtor.
29. WASH. REv. CoDE ch. 7.33 (1970).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 733.280 (1970).
31. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.33.370 (1970).
32. WASH. RPv. CODE § 7.33.110 (1970).
33. The limited scope of the Act as finally enacted has drawn criticism from some
commentators. See 68 Mcc. L. REv. 986, 988 (1970) ("[this modest provision"); Boyd,
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act--A Consumer Perspective, 45 NoTRE
D A L. 171, 193 (1970) (calling the wage exemption too small, the employee discharge
provision too conservative, and criticizing the failure of the Act to cover prejudgment
garnishment).
34. WASH. REv. CODE § 733.010(2) (1970).
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(a) is not a resident of this state, or is about to move from this
state; or
(b) has concealed himself, absconded, or absented himself so
that ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him; or
(c) has removed or is about to remove any of his property from
this state, with intent to delay or defraud his creditors and the
plaintiff... files an affidavit stating the specific facts upon which
his belief is founded and the court pursuant to an ex parte hear-
ing finds that there is sufficient reason to find the belief true.
Determining whether this section passes muster under Sniadach
requires an examination of the Court's language in that decision. Mr.
Justice Douglas, for the majority, defined the issue as follows: "In
the context of this case the question is whether the interim freezing
of the wages without a chance to be heard violates procedural due
process 135 (emphasis added). The Court answered that question in
the affirmative, since the defendant was a resident of the state and
"in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable." 36
The Court has indicated that in some circumstances it would ap-
prove of the summary taking of property without a prior hearing.
Summary seizure has been permitted, for example, to protect the
public health, to protect the economic welfare of depositors,3" and
to maintain public confidence in financial institutions.39 In Sniadack
the Court labelled such cases as "extraordinary circumstances" which
might justify summary action, but refused to include the collection
of consumer debts in that category, stating, "in the present case no
situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest
35. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). The Court felt that for purposes of due process anal-
ysis, an "interim freezing" of wages was a "taking" of property. "A prejudgment
garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may impose a tremendous hard-
ship on wage earners with families to support." Id. at 340.
36. Id. at 339.
37. Ewing v. Mytinger & Castleberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), upheld seizure of
misbranded pharmaceuticals without a prior hearing to insure that such drugs would not
he sold to the public. See also North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908) (upholding the summary seizure of putrid poultry).
38. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (upholding a statute which authorized
the prejudgment attachment of the property of stockholders of insolvent banks, to prevent
fraud on depositors and creditors).
39. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (upholding a statute dealing with the
pre-hearing appointment of conservators to take possession of federally insured savings
and loan institutions).
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is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn
to meet any such unusual conditions."40 In addition, the Court em-
phasized the unique nature of wages which strongly militated against
their summary attachment.41
While the language of the opinion suggests that the Court employed
a "balancing test" in determining whether creditor interests in obtain-
ing summary relief outweighed the debtor's due process right to notice
and opportunity to be heard, the Court can be criticized for not ade-
quately articulating what the creditor interests were, or how, on
related issues, future courts might determine how the relative interests
should be balanced. The majority opinion would be considerably
more useful to the lower courts if Mr. Justice Douglas had more
carefully indicated what sort of "narrowly drawn" statute permitting
the "interim freezing" of wages prior to a hearing would satisfy due
process requirements. The Court's heavy emphasis on the uniqueness
of wages might suggest that no prejudgment wage garnishment statute
could be constitutional on its face, since few statutes could be written
narrowly enough to cover only the truly unusual case. It is in this
context that Washington's prejudgment garnishment statute must
be examined.
The three exceptions to the general prohibitions on prejudgment
wage garnishments in the Washington Act43 would permit summary
action against any non-resident, a debtor who is absconding or hiding
40. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
41. In Sniadach, the Court discussed the nature of wages as follows:
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general . . .
does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. The fact that a
procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary
protection to all property in its modern forms. We deal here with wages-a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.
395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
42. The majority is roundly criticized for its "emotional rhetoric" and method of
analysis by Mr: Justice Black, who argued that the "Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment contains no words that indicate that this Court has power to play
so fast and loose with state laws." 395 U.S. at 344 (Black, J., dissenting). See also 68
MzcH. L. lrv. 986, 988 (1970):
Indeed, the majority opinion does appear to be quite heavily underscored by a
value judgment concerning the impropriety of such garnishment. Thus, it is arguable
that, while the Court claimed to base its decision solely on grounds of a denial
of procedural due process, it was also motivated by the old concept of substantive
due process.
43. WAsm LREV. CODE § 7.33.010(2) (1970). See text accompanying note 34, supra.
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from the process-server, or a debtor who conceals or removes his
assets to defraud his creditors. While the new prejudgment garnish-
ment section is a considerable improvement over the former statute
under which a creditor could obtain a prejudgment wage garnishment
merely by filing a complaint accompanied by a form affidavit stating
that the debt was actually due and that the plaintiff did not sue to
injure the defendant,4 it is not entirely free of defects. First, while
it appears that the absconding debtor and the debtor who fraudulently
hides or removes his property would fall under the Sniadach "unusual
circumstances" exception, it is not clear why non-residency by itself
should be considered sufficient justification for issuing a prejudgment
writ. The term "non-resident" is not defined in the Act, and could
arguably mean either a non-domiciliary or a person who is not living
in the state. There can be no justification, however, for allowing the
extraordinary prejudgment wage garnishment remedy against any
person who is regularly present in the state to earn his living, since in
personam jurisdiction can be readily obtained over him.45 Since the
Court in Sniadach condemned the prejudgment garnishment of the
wages of any person who was readily available for personal service
of process,46 the Washington statute would seem to be unconstitutional
whether or not "non-resident" is read broadly to mean non-domiciliary.
Furthermore, since the following section, which covers "the employee
who has concealed himself, absconded, or absented himself so that
ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him,"4 7 would cover
the defendant who has left the state, the subsection allowing such
process against the "non-resident, or one who is about to leave the
state" should be deleted. 8 The defendant who is about to leave can
44. See Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 747.
45. In Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), it was not the residency of the debtor
which the Court considered determinative when it allowed the prejudgment garnishment
of a debt owed him by a debtor who was in the state but the inability of the state to
obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. Obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant is considerably less difficult under modem long arm statutes than it was in
the days of Harris v. Balk. Consequently, it is submitted that a state law which permits
prejudgment attachment or garnishment in any case other than a case involving
inability of a plaintiff to obtain in personam jurisdiction is violative of due process
guarantees, unless fraud is involved.
46. See note 36 and accompanying text, supra.
47. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.33.010(2)(b) (1970).
48. WASir. REv. CODE § 7.33.010(2)(a) (1970).
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be personally served before he leaves, and there appears to be no justifi-
cation for allowing prejudgment garnishment of his wages unless it
can be shown, in addition, that he is leaving with the intent of avoid-
ing his creditors. To fall within the permissible limits of Sniadach a
prejudgment wage garnishment statute may cover only the exceptional
case-the wrongdoer who absconds or hides his property or the per-
son over whom in personam jurisdiction cannot be readily obtained.
"Non-residency" is too all-encompassing a term to fall within these
limits.
Another potential problem with the prejudgment garnishment sec-
tion is that it permits a creditor who "believes" that his debtor is
hiding, leaving the state, or concealing his property to obtain a pre-
judgment writ by presenting an affidavit containing his beliefs at an
ex parte hearing. The provision might appear to be a loophole through
which creditors could evade the Act's general restriction on prejudg-
ment writs by painting a one-sided picture of the debtor as a person
who is wrongfully avoiding his obligation, thereby giving the court
grounds to issue a prejudgment writ. Nor is there any "challenge pro-
cedure" to allow the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's allegations. It
would indeed be unfortunate if the prohibition on prejudgment gar-
nishments could be so easily subverted.49
This apparent loophole may, in practice, not exist, as it appears
unlikely that the courts will permit such subversion of the garnishment
statute.5 One commentator has observed: 1
Although prejudgment garnishment without prior notice or hear-
ing may be constitutionally permissible in some situations, its use
as a device to reach a debtor's wages has been practically elimi-
49. Such creation of loopholes is sometimes inadvertent, as the legislature attempts
to set up what appears to be an adequate procedure, without examining abuses which
persisted and flourished in the past. The Supreme Court itself, in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), created a
procedure for obtaining building search warrants under which abuses were predictable.
See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, 387 U.S. at 546. See also 1967 UTAH
L. REv. 589, 596.
50. The courts have had sufficient experience with the abusive use of garnishment
process by creditors in the past, and appear unlikely to allow the new procedure to be
misused. See notes 51, 52, and 73 and accompanying text, infra.




nated by Sniadach because wages are not the kind of debt usually
owed to a non resident and wage earners are not likely to abscond
and leave their jobs to avoid paying their debts.
Thus, it would appear that where the wage earner is concerned, a
creditor's notions or beliefs about the non-residency of the debtor (if
that alone can ever be sufficient grounds for prejudgment garnish-
ment), or about the likelihood of his debtor absconding, should be
viewed with a high degree of suspicion. Furthermore, the history of
the improper use of wage garnishment by a large number of unscrupu-
lous creditors has created a "credibility gap" of major proportions
where creditor allegations are concerned. A former justice court judge
has observed:52
Experience in the writer's court indicates that . . . [t]here are
some collection companies that seem utterly incapable of filing a
complaint that is supportable in full by the evidence. Nor is there
any indication that plaintiffs are more virtuous than defendants.
It therefore appears that it would be an unlikely occurrence when a
Washington court would or should grant a prejudgment writ of garnish-
ment against a debtor's wages, in spite of some apparent laxity built
into the statute.
This conclusion is buttressed by empirical data from the Seattle
District Justice Court. The statistics show that in the six months prior
to the passage of the 1969 Act, the average monthly civil caseload of
the Seattle District Justice Court was 1,838 cases, of which 1,172
involved writs of garnishment. Of these 1,172 garnishments issued,
684, or 58.4% were prejudgment writs.5 3 Since the passage of the Act,
the civil caseload has dropped significantly. Whereas before the Act's
passage, garnishments were involved in 64% of the court's cases, gar-
nishments have since accounted for less than 40% of the court's case-
load.54 Most significantly, the prejudgment writ of garnishment has
52. Patterson, supra note 9, at 740 .
53. Data provided by Mrs. Mary Hay, Chief Civil Clerk, Seattle District justice
Court.
54. The following table will illustrate the effect of Sniadach and the 1969 Washington
Garnishment Act on the volume of garnishments issued by the Seattle District justice
Court.
432
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virtually disappeared from the scene. Between July 1, 196911 and
June 30, 1970, the Seattle District Justice Court has issued 5,096
writs of garnishment; only 48, or less than one per cent, were issued
prior to judgment, and it appears that not one of these involved
wages.56
Thus, it appears that the prejudgment garnishment of wages in
Washington may have become a thing of the past. The 1969 Act, not
adequately rigorous on its face, is being interpreted quite narrowly, in
SuMRY oF GAumsnwEnq Pnoc 3mOs SATTLE DIsTicT JusnIcE CouRT
January 1969 to July 1970
Total
Total Garnishments
Month Civil Caseload Issued Prejudgment Postjudgment
Jan. 1969 1,723 1,209 689 520
Feb. 1969 1,779 1,169 736 433
Mar. 1969 1,917 1,201 714 487
Apr. 1969 2,080 1,148 646 502
May 1969 1,690 1,131 632 499
Jun. 1969* 1,332 730 176 554
Jul. 1969 1,521 681 0 681
Aug. 1969*4 1,234 437 2 435
Sept. 1969 1,203 380 0 380
Oct. 1969 1,258 459 0 459
Nov. 1969 1,017 374 0 374
Dec. 1969 1,012 315 9 306
Jan. 1970 1,198 388 3 385
Feb. 1970 1,083 354 3 351
Mar. 1970 1,180 379 5 374
Apr. 1970 1,258 442 12 430
May 1970 1,008 450 4 446
Jun. 1970 1,181 417 10 407
Source:
Monthly Reports, Seattle District Justice Court
Notes:
*June 9, 1969 (U.S. Supreme Court decided Sniadach).
**August 11, 1969 (Washington Garnishment Act went into effect).
55. Although the 1969 Washington Garnishment Act did not go into effect until
August 11, 1969, the Justice Courts stopped issuing prejudgment writs immediately after
Sniadach was decided on June 9 of that year. This accounts for the sharp drop in
Prejudgment writs issued during June of 1969, and subsequently. Also notable from the
le in note 54, supra, is the fact that there was a noticeable decrease in postjudgment
garnishments after the 1969 Act became effective. Seattle Justice Court Judge Lewis sug-
gested that this is at least partially attributable to the imposition of a ten dollar fee
which the plaintiff must send to the garnishee employer (presumably to cover the
garnishee's costs), as required by section 13 of the Act, to perfect service of the writ.
Since some creditors were garnishing for quite small amounts, the payment of the fee
made garnishment of such small amounts unprofitable. Interview with Seattle District
Court Judge Bill Lewis, in Seattle, July 31, 1970.
56. Interview with Seattle District Court Judge Lewis, in Seattle, July 31, 1970.
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harmony with the spirit of Sniadach, to effectively prevent the "grave
injustices made possible by prejudgment garnishment whereby the
sole opportunity to be heard comes after the taking."5 7
III. WASHINGTON WAGE EXEMPTION PROVISIONS
It was suggested in the Empirical Study that the low wage exemp-
tion of the former garnishment procedure contributed to its frequent
use by creditors as a "club" to obtain quick settlements by debtors. 8
Under the now-repealed Washington wage exemption statute,59 the
minimum exemption from wage garnishment was $35 per week; the
maximum was $50 per week. The 1969 Act broadened the wage exemp-
tion considerably; the amount of an employee's wage now exempt
from garnishment equals either forty times the state minimum wage,60
or seventy five per cent of the total disposable earnings due to the
employee, whichever is larger. 61
In setting the amount of the wage exemption, the Legislature re-
jected the recommendation of the Empirical Study for an 85 per cent
rate, 2 settling instead on the seventy five per cent level adopted by
Congress in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The Federal Act
provides a minimum wage figure, equaling thirty times the federal
minimum wage, currently $1.60 per hour, beneath which no wages may
be subjected to garnishment.6 Whatever the merits of various proposed
57. 395 U.S. at 340. It was feared, before examining the Justice Court data, that
creditors might begin a wholesale campaign to obtain prejudgment garnishments against
bank accounts. The Arizona Supreme Court, in Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105
Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969), read Sniadach narrowly, as covering the prejudgment
garnishment of wages only. Such a reading of Sniadach might be possible, mainly because
of the majority opinion's emphasis on the uniqueness of wages, and its failure to discuss
adequately the need of a debtor for a subsistence fund, whatever its nature. If the
needs of the debtor for such a fund are considered, however, an attempt to distinguish
unpaid wages and just-paid wages placed on deposit in a bank as different kinds of assets
would be logically impossible.
58. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 752; See also 43 IowA L. REV. 555 (1958).
59. Ch. 13, § 1 11963] Wash. Sess. Laws (repealed 1969).
60. The current state minimum hourly wage is $1.60. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.020
(1970).
61. WAsHr. REV. CODE § 7.33.280 (1970).
62. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 785-88. This is also the exemption adopted in
Illinois. ILL. ANNr. STAT. ch. 62, § 73 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. V, 1970). The minimum exemption, annualized, under the
federal act would be $2,496; under the Washington act, $3,328. Of course, using the
percentage formulas in either act will work dollar exemptions larger than the minimum
exemption, but only for higher income debtors.
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wage exemptions,6" it is notable that the exemptions under the Wash-
ington Act are equal to or larger than the exemptions under the Fed-
eral Act. While both the federal and Washington acts exempt seventy
five per cent of disposable income, the Washington Act provides a
higher minimum wage level which is totally exempt from garnishment.
Under the Federal Act, thirty times the federal minimum wage, or $48,
would be the minimum wage exemption. By comparison, the Washing-
ton minimum wage exemption is now forty times the state minimum
wage, or $64. For debtors with weekly disposable earnings between
the $48 and the $80 level, the Washington Act provides a higher effec-
tive exemption rate, approaching, at least for the low income debtor,
the rate recommended by the Empirical Study.05 Since the Washington
Act provides for more limited garnishments than the federal Consumer
64. The Ermpirical Study noted that no one formula, even a fixed percentage formula,
would operate equitably at all income levels, since the low income family spends a
higher percentage of its income for necessities than would a higher income family.
Thus, a fixed percentage exemption which is fair to low income debtors would appear
to be ridiculously high when applied to the high income debtor. Empirical Study, supra
note 1, at 787.
65. The following tables show the wage exemptions available to garnishment debtors
under the federal and state acts. The exemptions are computed as discussed in the text.
FEnmAL Ac'T
Weekly Maximum Amount Subject Effective
Wage* Exemption to Garnishment Exemption Rate
$40 $48.00 0 100%
$50 $48.00 $ 2.00 96%
$60 $48.00 $12.00 80%
$70 $52.50 $17.50 75%
$80 $60.00 $20.00 75%$85 $63.75 $21.25 75%
$100 $75.00 $25.00 75%
$120 $90.00 $30.00 75%
WAsHNGmTOT AcT
$40 $64.00 0 100%
$50 $64.00 0 100%
$60 $64.00 0 100%
$70 $64.00 $ 6.00 91.4%
$80 $64.00 $16.00 80%
$85 $64.00 $21.00 75.3%
$100 $75.00 $25.00 75%
$120 $90.00 $30.00 75%
* Note: the weekly wage, upon which these figures are based, is the "disposable
earnings" figure, determined by deducting from the gross earnings figure those amounts
"required by law to be deducted." See 15 US.C. § 1672 (Supp. V, 1970) and WAsr. RPy.
Cona § 7.33.280 (Supp. 1970).
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Credit Protection Act, the Washington provision should be control-
ling.66 The enlargement of the wage exemption in garnishment actions
is a recognition of the desirability of permitting a debtor to maintain
a reasonable minimum standard of living while at the same time insur-
ing that his creditors have some fund available to obtain satisfaction
of judgment obligations. 67
A further notable improvement in Washington is the statutory lan-
guage making the wage exemption automatic.6 The Empirical Study
reported that under the former statute the exemption, 9 which was
available only upon request, was claimed in only 7 % of all garnishment
actions.7 1 Since few debtors were aware that such exemptions were
available to them,"1 the inclusion of a provision making the wage ex-
emption automatic should be considered a necessary safeguard and a
commendable addition."
IV. WASHINGTON EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE PROVISIONS
Another frequent criticism of state garnishment laws was that they
permitted the employer practice of discharging employees whose wages
had been garnished. Creditors, aware of this practice, often employed
the threat of garnishment as a highly effective means of collecting
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (Supp. V, 1970).
67. See Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WAsH. L. REv.
484, 500 (1961).
68. "Unless directed otherwise by the court, the garnishee shall determine and deduct
the amount exempt under this section and shall pay this amount to the defendant."
WASH. RV. CODE § 7.33.280 (1970).
69. Ch. 13, § 1 [19631 Wash. Sess. Laws (repealed 1969).
70. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 748.
71. Id.; see Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. LJ. 618
(1967).
72. Judge Lewis observed that even the number of postjudgment writs might be re-
duced if defendants were somehow made aware of their rights. More than half of the
defendants in creditor actions allow default judgments to be entered against them. Al-
though it is impossible to determine how many actions involve defendants who could
assert a valid defense to the debt, it appears clearly from studies on the use of the
legal collection machinery by a number of marginally honest merchants, that there is
a good probability that a significant number of creditor suits involve such defendants.
Judge Lewis suggests that legal pleadings are too imposing and formalistic to be well-
understood by poor or uneducated defendants, and that perhaps more defendants would
assert defenses if the summons and complaint were written in plainer, more understand-
able language, making it clear that a defendant who feels that he does not owe the debt
complained of, or who disagrees with the amount of the debt claimed by the plaintiff,
should come into court and let the fact be known, and not allow a default judgment to
be entered. Interview with Seattle District Court Judge Lewis, in Seattle, July 31, 1970.
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disputed debts from debtors who would go to any length to protect
their jobs.7" By the use of such pressure, many debts which were prob-
ably unenforceable in a court of law were collected.74 Although it was
strongly urged in the hearings on the proposed federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act that Congress prohibit employers from discharg-
ing their employees because their wages had been garnished,75 Con-
gress, in what has been described as a compromise, 76 provided that no
employer may discharge an employee because the employee's wages
had been subjected to garnishment "for any one indebtedness. 77 The
Washington Act adopted a provision more favorable to the employee-
debtor, prohibiting discharges of employees because of wage garnish-
ment unless the employee's wages have been garnished "on three or
more separate indebtednesses" within any twelve month period. 8 Since
the Washington provision is more restrictive than the federal act, the
state provision again will control.79 The choice of three garnishments
as a cutoff point for the operation of the prohibition on employee dis-
charges appears to be a reasonable balancing of the interests of a debt-
ridden employee, who might encounter more than one garnishment
proceeding against him, by different creditors, resulting from a single
financial crisis, and the interests of employers, who often must suffer
the bookkeeping costs of processing wage garnishments and the poor
work and absenteeism often observed in employees who are going
through continual bouts with their creditors0
The provision should also alleviate the problem of the limited dura-
tion of the writ, which may cause the same creditor to file several
consecutive writs to collect the total amount of his judgment against
the debtor.8 Since an employee cannot be discharged for repeated
73. The state participated in this coercive process by making the garnishment remedy
available to creditors without any showing that a prejudgment writ was really necessary
or proper. In discussing the laxity of the former garnishment statute Judge Patterson
summed up just how one-sided the procedure was: "In effect, then, the state legislature
has authorized garnishment solely on the basis that the plaintiff is the plaintiff." Patter-
son, supra note 9, at 740.
74. Id. at 740, 741.
75. Testimony of I. W. Abel, United Steelworkers President, Hearings, supra note 10,
at 753; see also Hearings 813.
76. 68 M1cE. L. REv. 986, 988 (1970).
77. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. V, 1970).
78. WAsH. Rav. CODE § 7.33.160 (1970).
79. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (Supp. V, 1970).
80. See Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 755.
81. Since the Act provision deals with "separate indebtednesses," the employee cannot
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garnishment on the same indebtedness, it appears to be of no particular
consequence to the debtor whether the writ is short-term or whether
it creates a lien which continues until the entire obligation is paid.
However, a short-duration writ could be a major nuisance to employ-
ers, who must process each writ as it comes in. Presumably the ten-
dollar fee 81 paid by the creditor to the garnishee will cover the costs
of processing writs, but they will still remain a major inconvenience,
especially to large employers. The Empirical Study recommended the
creation of a continuing writ, which would pick up non-exempt portions
of a debtor's wages for a period of up to 90 days, to alleviate the
need for a disturbing number of writs to collect a single debt.8 3 In the
1969 Act, the legislature created a one-shot writ, which picked up only
those wages owed to a defendant at the time the writ was served.84
During the 1970 session, however, the Legislature modified the scope
of the writ to permit a continuing lien for up to 30 days. 5 While the
creation of this longer duration writ is an improvement it is still
recommended that the legislature lengthen the duration of the writ
to 90 days, to include in a single writ the majority of judgment
obligations.86
Section 35 of the 1969 Act (RCW 50.20.045) states that a person
who is separated from his employment as a result of garnishment of
his wages "shall not be disqualified from receiving unemployment bene-
fits because of such separation."8" Ordinarily under Washington law,
be discharged when his creditor files a series of garnishments to satisfy the total obliga-
tion owed, since these would all relate to the same indebtedness. Filing a number of
garnishments against a debtor for a single indebtedness will be necessary where the wage
exemption makes available for garnishment only a small portion of the unpaid judgment
obligation. For example, a debtor against whom a total judgment obligation of $250 is
entered, and whose disposable earnings equal $100 per week, can have only $25 per week
garnished under the wage exemption provision. Since the writ's duration is only 30 days,
the creditor must obtain three writs to recover the entire judgment obligation.
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.130 (1970) requires the creditor to pay the garnishee
ten dollars to perfect service of the writ.
83. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 789.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.110 (1970).
85. Ch. 61, § 7, [1970] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., WASH. REv. CODE § 7.33.370 (1970).
86. In the cases surveyed by the Empirical Study, the average judgment equalled $221,
including costs. See Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 796, Table 3. With the 75% wage
exemption, only from those debtors whose weekly disposable incomes exceeded $220 could
a sufficient amount be garnished to recover the entire judgment within the 30-day life
of the present writ. Since few debtors have $220 weekly disposable incomes, it is apparent
that the 30-day writ is still unrealistically short in duration.
87. Ch. 264, § 35 [1969] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.045
(1970).
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an employee discharged from his employment for "misconduct" would
be ineligible for unemployment benefits during the week of his dis-
charge and for up to a maximum of ten weeks.8 The applicability of
RCW 50.20.045 is made "subject to the provisions of RCW 7.33.160"119
which makes a discharge for the reason that the employee's wages
were garnished a "wrongful" discharge. While the language of RCW
50.20.045 is a bit ambiguous,90 its application by the Washington State
88. WASH. RaV. CODE § 50.20.060 (1970) makes one discharged for "misconduct con-
nected with his work" ineligible for benefits. Prior to the passage of the 1969 Garnish-
ment Act, by directive from the state headquarters, the Washington State Employment
Security Department had interpreted "misconduct" to include discharges because of wage
garnishment problems. The Department would take statements from the applicant and
his former employer to determine the reason for the termination, and if it were deter-
mined that the employee was fired because of creditor problems, he would be denied
statutory benefits. The Washington courts have never interpreted the "misconduct" sec-
tion; the Department employed the test for misconduct stated by the Wisconsin court in
Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941). Telephone interview
with Mr. Willard Cogdill, Washington State Employment Security Department, August 5,
1970.
89. WASH. Rav. CODE § 50.20.045 (1970). WAsir. Rav. CODE § 7.33.160 (1970) pro-
hibits the discharge of employees whose wages have been garnished on fewer than three
separate indebtednesses during a twelve month period. See note 78 and accompanying text,
supra.
90. Several possible interpretations could be made of the section as it now stands.
First, it is arguable that the Legislature intended simply to clarify the status of employees
discharged because of garnishments, with relation to eligibility for unemployment com-
pensation. Under this interpretation, WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.045 (1970) is merely
declaratory of rights created by WASH. REv. CODE § 7.33.160, the employee discharge
provision. WASH. RLa. CODE § 7.33.160 makes it clear that an employee who has been
garnished on fewer than three separate debts in one year, and has been discharged be-
cause of garnishment, has been wrongfully discharged. Under previously existing law,
an applicant for unemployment benefits could be turned down if he had been discharged
for misconduct. An employee wrongfully discharged cannot be said to have been dis-
charged for cause, thus WASH. Rzv. CODE § 50.20.045 really adds nothing which was not
already declared by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.160.
A totally undesirable interpretation of WASH. PEv. CODE § 50.20.045 is also possible.
WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.045 arguably preserves the misconduct definition previously
applied to the eligibility statute (see note 88, supra), and declares that benefits may
still be withheld from discharged employees except in those cases coming under WASH.
Rzv. CODE § 7.33.160. To adopt this view of the provision would perpetuate the attitude
that indebtedness is a sign of moral inadequacy (an attitude making little sense in an
era of widespread use of consumer credit), and would run counter to the prevailing
spirit of reform which runs through the remainder of the Act, a spirit expressed in
numerous provisions designed to allow the debtor to maintain a reasonable standard
of living while he pays his debts.
The Washington State Employment Security Department, however, treats WASH. Rv.
CODE § 50.20.045 as a flat ban on denials of benefits to workers discharged for debt
problems. By itself, WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.045 could not be read in a manner which
would render the "subject to RCW 7.33.160" language utterly meaningless. Perhaps the
Department has interpreted the section to be a policy declaration by the Legislature that
discharge for debt problems is no longer "misconduct" within the meaning of WASH.
IV. CODE 50.20.060 (1970), and that the previous interpretation of that statute (see
note 88, supra) should be abandoned.
The Legislature should amend section 35 to clarify its intent, and it is recommended
that the Department's policy should be clearly adopted as the statutory language.
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Employment Security Department, which administers the unemploy-
ment compensation fund, has been consistent with the most laudable
spirit of reform which permeates the entire 1969 Act. The Department
treats all applicants discharged from their jobs because of garnishments
as eligible for unemployment benefits, without regard for the number
of garnishments involved,91 recognizing that it is not the business of
the state to punish persons who encounter debt problems. Considering
the massive extent of the practice of "selling credit" in this country,
particularly to low income wage earners,92 it should come as no surprise
that many persons will be "sold" into a debt position they are unable
to manage. The Empirical Study's admonition, "A debtor should not be
treated as an unscrupulous deadbeat, but rather as a casualty of our
credit economy," 93 is a sound credo for all consumer credit reform
legislation. The inclusion of RCW 50.20.045 in the 1969 Garnishment
Act and its administration by the state indicate an encouraging trend
toward reform of not only specific laws but also the underlying philoso-
phy behind creditor-debtor laws generally.
V. REMEDIES FOR WRONGFUL GARNISHMENT
The remedy for wrongful garnishment is recovery of the amount
garnished, other damages resulting from the wrongful garnishment,
and reasonable attorney's fees.94 While the former garnishment statutes
required a bond in all prejudgment garnishments involving more than
$300,9' the 1969 Act requires the posting of a garnishment bond only
in garnishments brought in superior court.96 While it is quite fitting
that prejudgment garnishments brought in superior courts, where the
amounts involved are substantial, 7 should not be issued without the
91. This procedure is pursuant to a directive issued by Employment Security Depart-
ment officials. Telephone interview with Mr. Willard Cogdill, Washington State Employ-
ment Security Department, in Seattle, August 5, 1970.
92. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 91 (1968).
93. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 793.
94. Olson v. National Grocery Co., 15 Wn. 2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942). A showing
that the garnishment was wrongfully sued out is sufficient to complete the cause of ac-
tion for wrongful garnishment; no showing of malice or lack of probable cause is neces-
sary. Id.
95. Ch. 95, § 2 [1965] Wash. Sess. Laws (repealed 1969).
96. WAsHr. Rav. CODE § 7.33.020 (1970).
97. The superior courts of the State of Washington have jurisdiction over disputes
involving amounts in excess of $300. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.08.010 (1955). However, since
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posting of a bond, the omission of the bond requirement from the jus-
tice courts, where the overwhelming majority of garnishments are
brought,98 is a curious anomaly. Although the number of prejudgment
writs of any type now issued is quite small, there is still good reason
for the law to require the posting of a garnishment bond in any case
in which the extraordinary remedy of prejudgment garnishment is
employed, to insure that the defendant has a fund out of which to re-
cover in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain judgment in the
underlying action.9 Section 34 of the 1969 Act provides that, in cases
in which prejudgment wage garnishment has been issued and where
judgment in the underlying action does not favor the plaintiff, the
defendant shall have cause of action for damages against the plain-
tiff.10 The Empirical Study stated that the provision for such private
consumer causes of action is of little significance, since few low-income
consumers have the desire, or the necessary resources to hire an attor-
ney to seek relief on such a small claim,' 0 ' and few attorneys would be
willing to handle the relatively small claims involved. The provision
the justice courts have jurisdiction of disputes involving amounts up to $1,000, few
creditors, except in very large suits, will seek prejudgment garnishments in Superior
Court. WAsH. Rv. CODE § 3.20.020(1) (a) (1970). It will therefore be a rare occasion when
a debtor whose property is garnished prior to judgment will be protected by a plaintiff's
bond.
98. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 777.
99. Consider the following comment on the need for a bond in ex parte injunction
proceedings:
The injunction bond appears to be the result of the interaction of two major com-
peting considerations. On the one hand is the traditional reluctance to penalize a
plaintiff for resorting to the judicial process or to make him pay a price for his
remedy. On the other is the extreme caution which often permeates judicial proceed-
ings and is reflected in their elaborate safeguards-the apprehension of a rash result
or a judgment rendered after inadequate deliberation. Anticipatory relief in the form
of an interlocutory judicial directive which stakes the dignity and authority of the
court on a decision made without extensive presentation of the facts or opportunity
for argument seems inconsistent with this established principle.
Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 E IAv. L. Rav. 333, 336(1959). Prejudgment garnishment is an "unusual anticipatory remedy" not unlike an ex
partse injunctive order in that it is granted after minimal consideration of factual issues
and without full argument, and by analogy the necessity for requiring a protective device
such as a bond should be evident.
100. Ch. 264, § 34 [19691 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. As adopted in 1969, this section
applied only to prejudgment wage garnishments. Since the only prejudgment writs issued,
in Seattle at least, since Sniadach were against assets other than wages, the 1970 Legis-
lature amended this section by deleting the words "of wages" thus making the wrongful
garnishment remedy available to any defendant whose property is wrongfully garnished
prior to judgment. Ch. 61, § 4, E1970] Wash. Laws. 1st Ex. Sess., WAsH. Rav. CODE
§ 7.33.340 (1970).
101. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 778.
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for a private cause of action is therefore not an effective remedy to the
consumer whose property has been garnished wrongfully. It would
seem that the only effective statutory remedy for wrongful garnishment
would require a garnishment bond in all prejudgment garnishments and
provide for the release of the bond upon a judgment for the plaintiff
or an automatic forfeiture of the bond upon a judgment for the defen-
dant in the underlying action. Such a provision would enable a defen-
dant to immediately recover damages without follow-up litigation
which, after an attorney is compensated, yields a net loss to the debtor
whose property has been wrongfully garnished. Providing an automatic
bond forfeiture would more equitably balance the creditor interest in
obtaining prejudgment relief in exceptional cases and the debtor inter-
est in protection against and redress for abuses of this extraordinary
legal procedure.
CONCLUSION
The Washington Garnishment Act of 1969, as amended, represents
a significant restructuring of the process of garnishment in the Wash-
ington courts. The act responds favorably to the chief problems and
abuses which had developed under previous laws relating to the garn-
ishment process. In the area of prejudgment garnishment, the area
in which the most serious abuses had been observed, the Washington
Act appears to restrict prejudgment garnishment to its proper role as
an extraordinary remedy. Except for its possibly unconstitutional al-
lowance of prejudgment garnishment against "non-residents," the pre-
judgment garnishment provision affords wage earners the procedural
due process declared to be mandatory in Sniadach.
The Washington Act has also made significant reforms in the areas
of wage exemptions and employee discharges. In both areas the pro-
visions of the Washington Act are more restrictive on garnishments,
and generally more progressive than the minimum national standards
established in the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. The Wash-
ington Act also insures that a debtor who does lose his job because of
garnishment will be permitted to receive unemployment compensation
benefits if he is otherwise eligible.
The 1969 Act and its 1970 amendments do not cure all the problems
which surround the garnishment process, however. The Act provides
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no real remedy for wrongful garnishment, and by inadequately resolv-
ing the problem of the limited duration of the writ, it continues the
administrative inconveniences inherent in a writ which does not remain
in effect for a sufficient length of time to pick up an entire judgment
obligation. On the major issues facing it, however, the Legislature has
brought this area of creditor-debtor law more closely into harmony
with the realities of the twentieth century credit economy, and has
removed much of the inequity which caused the former Washington
garnishment law to be justifiably condemned as "the modem equivalent
of a debtor's prison."'01 2
102. Empirical Study, supra note 1, at 793.
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